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SHIPPING CONTAINERS AS ORIGINAL
PACKAGES: ARE CONTAINERIZED IMPORTS
IMMUNE FROM STATE TAXATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The prohibition against state imposition of property taxes on
imports arises out of the constitutional admonition that "No State
shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports."' Cases specifically applying this provision to state taxes
levied on imported goods have held that it prohibits the taxation of
imported goods in their original packages while still in the hands of
the original importer.2 Since the adoption of this "original package"
doctrine, cases developing it have been confined to application of the
doctrine to specific imported items, focusing upon whether the im-
ports were in their original packages when taxed, and whether the
imports were held by the original importer when taxed. Today the
doctrine is the subject of a moderate amount of litigation, confined
mostly to the state courts.3
Within the past decade, however, the technological innovation
has occurred in the shipping industry which may soon be the source
of widespread litigation involving the application of the original pack-
age doctrine. This innovation is the development of the concept of
containerized shipping, involving the use of large reusable metal con-
tainers and mechanized cargo handling devices in transferring, han-
dling, stowing, discharging and delivering cargo.' Because of the com-
parative efficiency and low labor costs of this method in relation to
traditional methods, which required the packing and stowing of sepa-
rate items of cargo, containerized shipping has become the preferred
method of transporting goods by sea.-
The shipping containers themselves are similar to the semitrail-
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 [hereinafter cited as the import-export clause].
[Wlhile remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original
form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on
imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution.
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442 (1827). The case did not deal with a property
tax, but with a license tax imposed on importers.
I The last pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the subject appears in Department
of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
Containerships are vessels in which the cargo is carried preloaded in contain-
ers usually 8' x 8' x 40' or 8' x 8' x 20'. Instead of the traditional cargo hold
arrangement the containership hold is fitted with container guides into which the
preloaded containers are fitted.
Farrel Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm., 475 F.2d 1332, 1333 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1 An excellent summary of the container process may be found in Simon, The Law of
Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAR. LAW & Com. 507 (1974).
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ers which are commonly seen on the highways and are constructed
with retractable or removable wheels, thus permitting loading and
unloading by dockside cranes, as well as the stacking of the contain-
ers inside the ships. Upon arrival at the point of entry, the vans are
removed from the vessel, wheels are lowered or attached, and the
containers are connected to motor cabs for transportation to the
importer's warehouse. There the goods (in boxes or cases of their
own) are removed, and the container is returned to the shipper.
Prior to the advent of containerization, the intermediate steps of
this process were nonexistent. The only packages involved were the
actual boxes or cases in which the goods were shipped. After arrival
at the warehouse of the importer, if these boxes or cases were broken,
and the goods inside were exposed or removed, the "original pack-
age" was held to have been broken, and the goods became subject to
state taxation. Containerization, however, introduces another step in
the process-the aggregation of the packages into a larger receptacle.
If this larger receptacle can also be characterized as the "original
package" in which the goods are imported, then the removal of the
goods from the shipping container creates an event in the importation
process where states can assert their power to assess property taxes
free of the constitutional prohibition.
It is not the purpose of this article to engage in the detailed
analysis of either the development of the original package doctrine,
or of the characteristics of state ad valorem taxation. Rather, the
article will focus on the narrow question of whether a shipping con-
tainer is the original package of importation of goods imported in
that mode, for the purpose of determining the constitutional immun-
ity of those goods from state taxation. Analysis of this narrow ques-
tion is hampered by the paucity of legal commentary on the subject.
The containerization process itself is of recent origin, and its relation
to state taxation has become an issue in only two reported decisions:
Volkswagen Pacific Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,6 in which a Califor-
nia appeals court held that shipping containers were original pack-
ages, and Michigan State Tax Commission v. Garment Corp.,7 hold-
ing that containers were not original packages.
II. THE ORIGINAL PACKAGE DOCTRINE
At the inception of the federal union, it was a matter of concern
to many that to permit the several states to regulate their foreign
6 12 Cal. App. 3d 689, 90 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1970).
32 Mich. App. 715, 189 N.W.2d 72, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971).
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commerce would be to allow the maritime states to benefit from the
imposition of duties on imports and exports, to the detriment of
commerce in the inland states." Coupled with this was the desire to
place power to control foreign commerce in the federal Congress,
without interference from states seeking to advance their provincial
interests at the expense of the commercial health of the country as a
whole.9
Chief Justice Marshall referred to these concerns in Brown v.
Maryland,"0 but also recognized that an overbroad interpretation of
the import-export clause, permanently immunizing an import from
taxation, would result in deprivfng the states of substantial and neces-
sary revenue." Marshall chose to draw the line at that point where
"the importer has so acted upon the thing imported, that it has
become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the
country."' 2 That point, Marshall decided, is not reached until the
original package used in importation is broken. 3
Subsequent cases focused upon the question of what constitutes
an original package within the holding of Brown. A characteristic
case was Low v. Austin4 in which the Court held that imported
bottles of wine were not subject to a state ad valorem tax while
remaining in the original cases, unbroken and unsold, even when
those cases were offered for sale in the store of the importer.
Reversing the Supreme Court of California, the Court focused
on Marshall's language in Brown. The state had argued that since the
wines were offered for sale in the warehouse of the importer along
with domestic wines, they had become, under Brown, "incorporated
and mixed up with the mass of property" in the state and, therefore,
were subject to the tax. The Court rejected this argument stating:
[T]he goods imported do not lose their character as imports, and
become incorporated into the mass of property of the State, until
they have passed from the control of the importer or been broken
up by him from their original cases. Whilst retaining their character
as imports, a tax upon them, in any shape, is within the constitu-
tional prohibition. The question is not the extent of the tax, or its
Letter from James Madison to Professor Davis, 3 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 518-19 (1911).
'Id.
,0 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 438-40.
" Id. at 441.
12 Id.
Is Id.
1 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871).
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equality with respect to taxes on other property, but as to the power
of the State to levy any tax. 5
This apparent rejection of the "incorporation" formula seemed to
establish the package concept as the only standard for judging the
taxability of imports remaining in the hands of the original importer.
In order to take full advantage of the original package doctrine,
some importers adopted the device of having goods imported in very
small packages, which, in turn, would be packed in larger boxes. In
this manner they hoped to assert the immunity of each separately
packaged item from state taxation. Such a practice was the issue in
May v. New Orleans." The imports which were the subject of the
dispute were dry goods enclosed in small paper packages, which were,
in turn, packed in wooden cases. The importer would break open the
cases, and offer the small packages, still unbroken, for sale to his
customers. 17 When the city tried to levy a tax on these goods, May
argued that each small package was the "original package" of im-
port, and thus was immune from the tax.
Recognizing the adverse effects which would flow from accept-
ing this argument, the Supreme Court stated:
The result would be that there might be upon the shelves of a
merchant in this country, ready to be used and openly exposed for
sale, commodities or merchandise consisting of articles separately
wrapped and of enormous value that could not be reached for local
taxation until after he had sold them. . . .It cannot be overlooked
that the interpretation of the Constitution for which plaintiffs con-
tend would encourage American merchants and traders, seeking to
avoid state and local taxation, to import from abroad all the mer-
chandise and commodities which they would need in their business.
Thus impressed by the doctrine's susceptiblilty to abuse, the
Court struggled with the formulation of some rule which would qual-
ify the doctrine in a way that would prevent such abuse. Unable to
discern a method for distinguishing the reasonable from the unrea-
sonable, the Court fell back upon the previously discredited "incorpo-
ration" language in Brown, holding that the plaintiffs, in breaking
open the wooden cases and exposing the separate packages for sale,
had so acted upon the goods as to incorporate them into the mass of
property in the state. 9 In what seemed an obvious retreat from the
11 Id. at 34.
16 178 U.S. 496 (1900).
' Id. at 498.
18 Id. at 503.
" Id. at 508.
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package analysis in Low v. Austin, the Court failed to make any
reference to that case in its opinion.
In the next term, the Court undertook to refine somewhat the
concept of an "original package" in Austin v. Tennessee."0 Although
the case dealt with interstate commerce rather than with imports, and
involved a criminal statute rather than a taxing statute, it is neverthe-
less considered to be authoritative in the application of the original
package doctrine to problems created by state taxation of imports. 21
As in May, the case turned on the "package within a package"
problem. Here, the goods involved were cigarettes packaged ten each
in small paper packages, which, in turn, were loosely packed in large
baskets. In holding the baskets to be the original packages, the Court
focused upon the problem of the size of the original package, and
analyzed prior original package cases in this aspect. Although the
Court characterized the case as being wholly within the rule of May,
it again sought to formulate some standard of reasonableness, a task
it was unable to accomplish in May. The result was a test of commer-
cial reasonableness:
The real question in this case is whether the size of the package in
which the importation is actually made is to govern; or, the size of
the package in which bona fide transactions are carried on ....
We hold to the latter view. The whole theory of the exemption of
the original package from the operation of state laws is based upon
the idea that the property is imported in the ordinary form in which,
from time to time immemorial, foreign goods have been brought
into the country.Y
The Court's continuing reliance on the nature of the import
transaction was evident in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 23 a case
which extended the original package doctrine to cover imported
goods held by a manufacturer pending their use in the manufacturing
process.2 Only when the original packages were broken, or when the
- 179 U.S. 343 (1900).
21 See, e.g., Annot., 89 L. Ed. 1279, 1288 (1945); 15 AM. JUR. 2d, Commerce, §§ 44-45
(1964). Presently, general application of the original package doctrine as a bar to state regula-
tion of goods in interstate commerce is regarded as unsound. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431
(1936).
2 179 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added).
- 324 U.S. 652 (1945). The "packages" in this case were bales of hemp imported from
the Philippine Islands.
24 Previous cases which applied the package concept of Brown v. Maryland all proceeded
upon the assumption of Chief Justice Marshall in that opinion that "the object of importation
is sale." 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 442. The Court in Hooven recognized, however, that the
original package doctrine was also capable of application to goods imported for utilization in
a manufacturing process. 324 U.S. at 666.
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goods were subjected to manufacturing, would their immunity as
imports end.25 In discussing the difficulty of ascertaining in a particu-
lar case when the original package is broken, the Court noted that
"this supposed difficulty does not seem to have baffled judicial deci-
sion" since the original package doctrine was formulated Brown.21 In
reconciling the competing demands of the constitutional immunity
and of the state's power to tax, courts should be governed by consid-
erations of practicality,2n and should focus on the essential nature of
the import transaction, rather than on the formalities of the importa-
tion process. 21
The cases heretofore discussed all dealt with imported goods
which were commonly "packaged" in the ordinary sense of that
word. Lower courts, however, were faced with a conceptual dilemma
in applying the test of "original package" to commodities which are
not imported in a package form, such as cattle,29 oil,O and ferti-
lizer.31 Adapting their reasoning to a doctrine based on packages,
these courts developed a rule which characterizes the entire shipment
or aggregation of goods as an abstract sort of "package. 32
In E.J. Stanton & Sons v. Los Angeles County 3 the California
appeals court was concerned with the application of the original
package doctrine to the plaintiff's imported lumber. Each shipment
which plaintiff received was unloaded from the ship and transported
to its storage yard, where the lumber was sorted by size, thickness,
etc. However, each shipment was stacked as a discrete unit, and was
not comingled with lumber from other shipments. Plaintiff then sold
a portion of each stack prior to the date on which the tax was as-
sessed. When the county levied a tax on the remaining lumber, the
24 Although the Hooven case extended immunity to goods imported for use while in their
original packages, the opinion contained a basis for its own limitation in Mr. Justice Stone's
reservation of the question of whether an amount of inventory sufficient to meet current
operating needs could be considered to be in use as part of the manufacturing process. 324 U.S.
at 667.
2 The question was answered in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534
(1959), holding that an amount of goods essential to meet current operating needs was suffi-
ciently incorporated into the manufacturing process to lose their immunity as imports.
2 324 U.S. at 668.
v Id.
2Id.
2 Tres Ritos Ranch Co. v. Abbott, 44 N.M. 556, 105 P.2d 1070 (1940).
31 Galveston v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 15 F.2d 208 (S.D. Tex. 1926); Mexican Petro-
leum Corp. v. South Portland, 121 Me. 128, 115 A. 900 (1922).
31 In re Taxes, Pacific Guano & Fertilizer Co., 32 Haw. 431 (1932).
1 See, e.g., Columbus Steel Supply Co. v. Kosydar, 38 Ohio St. 2d 258, 313 N.E.2d 389
(1974); E.J. Stanton & Sons v. Los Angles County, 78 Cal. App. 2d 181, 177 P.2d 804, cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947).
3 78 Cal. App. 2d 181, 177 P.2d 804, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947).
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plaintiff paid under protest, and later brought an action to recover
the tax on the theory that the lumber was rendered immune from the
tax by the import-export clause.
The court reasoned that the object of wrapping goods in a pack-
age was to unify them as a single import and to prevent their loss and
destruction. This was seen as the concept behind the package analysis
in Brown, rather than any requirement that the goods be enclosed in
a tight or sealed container.3 4 Applying this modified package concept
to the lumber, the court reasoned that:
[T]he conclusion is irresistable [sic] that the unit of importation
is the original package. . .. Although a cargo in bulk may arrive
at the port of entry in irons, or wrapped and tied with hemp ropes,
or encircled with a silken thread or, as a herd of steers, have no
binder at all, yet the entire shipment without regard to its exterior
wrapper is the original package3
Applying this reasoning to the facts of the case, the court found that
the "invisible gossamer" which made each shipment of lumber an
original package was broken when portions of each shipment were
sold, even though the remainder was left undisturbed.36
The original package doctrine, in its present form, is susceptible
to a mechanistic application since it focuses on the physical charac-
teristics of the package, and on whether or not it has been altered or
acted upon in some way so as to be "broken." Even where the goods
are not physically packaged, and where no mechanical "breaking"
can be discerned, the test is still applied, by analogy, to the aggregate
or entire shipment. Nevertheless, even when applying this mechanis-
tic reasoning, courts have not lost sight of the policy behind the
doctrine, and have refused to adhere to a strictly mechanical analysis
where the bona fide nature of the transaction depends upon the com-
mercial reasonableness of the mode or unit of import.
III. THE CONTAINERIZATION PROCESS
Before considering the effect of the original package doctrine on
the containerization process, some pertinent characteristics of that
process should be noted.
The containers themselves are articles of transport equipment
that are constructed and intended for repeated use, and are designed
to be utilized for the storage of goods inside a ship. They may be
u Id. at 186, 177 P.2d at 807.
" Id. at 188, 177 P.2d at 807-8.
34 Id.
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transported by either rail or truck without unloading and reloading
the goods themselves." They are usually owned by the shipowner.35
Goods are stowed in the containers by the shipper in the same manner
as are goods conventionally stowed in the holds of ships, using the
proper braces, shoring, etc., so as to prevent the cargo from shifting
with the rolling of the ship. 9
As a consequence of the sturdy construction of the container, it
is no longer necessary for the shipper to package the goods with the
same degree of care. Consequently, the shipper may choose to use
corrugated cardboard or other inexpensive packaging material for
goods which required packaging in sturdy wood cases or casks when
shipped conventionally. 0
The container transportation process begins with the shipper
packing the goods in suitable boxes or other packaging material.
These packages are then stowed by the shipper in a container pro-
vided by the carrier. The container is then sealed, and transported to
the port facility by motor cab or by rail. Upon arrival at dockside,
the container's wheels are either removed or retracted, and the con-
tainer is loaded by crane into compartments of the ship specially
designed with tracks or channels to receive and hold the container.
Upon arrival at the port of entry, the process is repeated in
reverse, and the container is transported to the warehouse, factory,
or terminal of the importer. There the packages are unloaded from
the container by the importer and are stored in the importer's facility.
The container is then returned to the carrier.4
- 49 C.F.R. § 420.3(c) (1970) provides:
(c) "Container" means an article of transport equipment (liftvan, portable tank, or
other similar structure including normal accessories and equipment when imported
with the container), other than a vehicle or conventional packaging-
(1) Of a permanent character and accordingly strong enough to be suitable for
repeated use;
(2) Specifically designed to facilitate the carriage of goods by one or more modes of
transport, without intermediate unloading;
(3) Fitted with devices permitting its ready handling, particularly its transfer from
one mode of transport to another;
(4) So designed as to be easy to fill and empty; and-
(5) Having an internal volume of 1 cubic meter (35.3 cubic feet) or more.
, Simon, supra note 5, at 513.
Id. at 515.
40 Id. at 514-15.
II The process outlined is necessarily a generalization, since the specific procedures will
vary among different importers, carriers, and shippers. Outlines of specific methods may be
found in cases involving the containerized shipping process. See, e.g., Leather's Best, Inc. v.
S.S. Mormanclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Serrano v. United States Lines Co., 238 F.
Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Michigan State Tax Comm. v. Garment Corp. of American, 32
Mich. App. 715, 189 N.W.2d 72, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971).
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The apparent distinctions between traditional packaging 2 and
the shipping container are therefore several. The container is pro-
vided by the carrier; a package is provided by the shipper. The con-
tainer is reusable, while traditional packages are not. Title to the
container remains with the carrier, while title to packages normally
passes to the importer along with title to the goods. Finally, contain-
ers are utilized not only for protection of goods and ease of handling
(as are packages), but also as an integral part of the mode of trans-
port.43
IV. Is THE CONTAINER AN ORIGINAL PACKAGE?
A. Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles."
In the first case to consider the question of the effect of contai-
nerization on the immunity of imports from state taxation, containers
were held to be original packages.
The case dealt with the imposition of a business license tax by
the city on the sales activities of the plaintiffs, a Porsche distributor
and a Volkswagen distributor. Although the primary issues of the
case were the extent of the plaintiffs' business activities and the taxa-
bility of imported automobiles, 5 the court did consider the taxability
of automobile parts imported in containers, or "sea vans" as they
were referred to in the opinion.
The Porsche distributor ordered parts directly from the German
manufacturer, who packaged the parts separately and placed them in
the container, which was then transported by truck to the ship. Upon
arrival of the ship in this country, the containers were unloaded from
the ship and transported by truck to the Porsche distributor's ware-
"2 a "bundle put up for transportation or commercial handling; a thing in form to
become, as such, an article of merchandise or delivery from hand to hand." It
denotes "a thing suitable for transportation or handling." As ordinarily understood
in the commercial world, it means a shipping package or unit.
Aluminos Pozuelo Ltd. v. S.S. Navigator, 407 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1968).
10 The question of whether a container is a package has been a central problem in cases
arising under § 4 (5) of the Carriage of Goods at Sea Act [hereinafter cited COGSA], 46 U:S.C.
§ 1304 (1971), which provides a $500 per package limitation on the liability of the carrier for
goods damaged while in his care. Cf., Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 483 F.2d
645 (2d Cir. 1973); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971);
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970).
" 12 Cal. App. 3d 689, 90 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1970).
The taxability of the autos centered about the application of the original package
doctrine to "a situation where packaging is inherently impossible or impracticable." Citing
Stanton, the court ruled the entire shipment to be the original package, and held the autos
taxable as soon as separted from the rest of the shipment. 12 Cal. App. 3d at 699-700,90 Cal.
Rptr. at 909-10.
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house. There the container was opened, the contents removed, and
the container returned to the carrier. Each shipment of parts was
comprised of several containers.46
Evidently, the court did not consider the issue as presenting a
question quite so complex as the others in the case, and summarily
found the containers to be "original packages" on the sole authority
of May v. New Orleans.4 7 Consequently, the court held the contents
to be subject to an ad valorem tax after their removal from the
shipping container. Other than a short quotation from the opinion in
May,48 further analysis on the issue is absent.
That the court's conclusory language is unfounded is clear. The
opinion's absolute reliance upon the excerpt from May, without giv-
ing any indication that it recognized the special circumstances in that
case,49 and the subsequent clarification in Austin v. Tennessee,w
greatly undermines the opinion's value as persuasive authority.
B. Michigan State Tax Commission v. Garment Corp."
In the only reported case to date which focuses upon the "con-
tainer as an original package" question to any extent, a Michigan
court of appeals held that a container was not an original package.
The court in Garment Corp. was concerned with the levying of the
Detroit property tax on imported industrial garments located in the
plaintiff's warehouse. The garments were manufactured in Puerto
Rico,"2 where they were compressed and packed into large heavy-duty
cardboard cases. After being sealed with tape and reinforced with
steel strapping, the cases were packed into containers thirty-five feet
long. Upon arrival in port, the containers were transported to the
plaintiff's warehouse by motor cab. 53
Originally, the city recognized the immunity of these goods, but
in 1968 sought to tax them, arguing that their removal from the
1s 12 Cal. App. 3d at 699, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
47 Id.
Is In our judgment, the "original package" in the present case was the box or
case in which the goods imported were shipped, and when the box or case was opened
for the sale or delivery of the separate parcels contained in it, each parcel of goods
lost its distinctive character as an import and became property subject to taxation
by the state as other like properties situated within its limits.
12 Cal. App. 3d at 699, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 909 quoting 178 U.S. at 508.
" See text at note 17, supra.
SO See text at note 20, supra.
11 32 Mich. App. 715, 189 NW.2d 72, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 992 (1971).
12 Goods from territories of the United States are imports for the purposes of the import-
export clause. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 669-79 (1945).
13 32 Mich. App. at 717, 189 N.W. 2d at 72-73.
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shipping container constituted a "breaking" of the original package,
which stripped the goods of their constitutional protection. The state
tax commission sustained this argument. 4
In rejecting this analysis, the Michigan appellate court recog-
nized the distinction between containers and conventional packages.
As vans normally used in over-the-road transportation, reasoned the
court, the containers were the property of the carrier. 5 Recognizing
containerization as an innovation in the mode of transportation
rather than a new form of packaging, the court stated:
It can only be concluded that the vans and trailers are, in fact,
vehicles, or at least instruments of transportation, and the mere use
of a new technology in shipping does not destroy the tax immunity
of the property shipped."
Moreover, relying on language in Hooven,"7 the court pointed out
that the container method of shipment did not alter the essential
nature of the transaction through which the goods were imported.
Rather, it pertained merely to the formalities of transportation. 8
The fact that the Michigan court's analysis of the problem was
more thorough than that of the California court in Volkswagen
Pacific gives its opinion greater persuasive effect. However, both
opinions can be faulted in their failure to analyze the problem in
terms of fitting the container concept into the framework of cases
interpreting the original package doctrine. A convincing resolution of
the problem requires such an analysis.
C. A Suggested Analysis
At the outset, it must be recognized that shipping containers are
articles of transport equipment and not conventional packages. The
functional differences between containers andconventional packaging
have already been discussed. Furthermore, most courts which have
considered other legal aspects of containerization have recognized the
" Id. at 717, 189 N.W.2d at 73.
N Id. at 718, 189 N.W.2d at "4.
"Id.
-" The language quoted from Hooven read:
When the merchandise is brought from another country to this, the extent of its
immunity from state taxation turns on the essential nature of the transaction, consid-
ered in the light of the constitutional purpose, and not on the formalities with which
the importation is conducted or on the technical procedures by which it is effected.
324 U.S. 652, 663.
u 32 Mich App. at 720, 189 N.W.2d at 74.
" See Section III, supra.
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distinction." Applying this characterization of the container process
to the analysis of the problem raised under the original package
doctrine necessarily results in supporting the conclusion that contain-
ers, in most cases, are not "original packages."
The same result is compelled when the problem is viewed in light
of the test of commercial reasonableness developed in Austin v.
Tennessee. Since bona fide transactions between foreign shippers and
domestic importers are usually carried on in units of boxes, cases,
cartons, etc., which are the traditional units of importation of goods,
it would seem that these are the original packages, and not the con-
tainer used by the shipper. Stated in another way, the original pack-
age would be the form in which the shipper delivers the goods to the
carrier, before they are place inside the shipping container. This result
is not inconsistent with the holdings in May v. New Orleans or in
Austin v. Tennessee, since the immunity of small packages imported
by container would depend upon whether the packages were commer-
cially reasonable units in which bona fide transactions between ship-
per and importer are normally carried on."1
Likewise, the use of containers for the importation of commodi-
ties which were not traditionally capable of packaging should create
little difficulty if the container is not regarded as a package. If the
package is considered to be the form in which the goods were deliv-
ered to the carrier, containerization would have no effect on the
application of precedent. For example, if bulk lumber were imported
in a container, the aggregate of lumber could still be argued to be the
original package according to the reasoning of cases like Stanton.
In each of these examples, since the "essential nature of the
transaction""2 between importer and shipper is not altered by the
0o [P]ackage is thus more sensibly related to the unit in which the shipper packed
the goods and described them than to a large metal object, functionally a part of
the ship, in which the carrier caused them to be "contained."
Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F. 2d 800, 815 (2d Cir. 1971). See also, DuPont
de Nemours International S.A. v. S.S. Mormacvega, 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974); Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
964 (1970).
1t An acceptable standard or definition of what constitutes a commercially reasonable unit
of importation is suggested by the following:
"Commercial unit" means such unit of goods as by commercial usage is a single
whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its character or
value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article (as a
machine) or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an assortment of sizes) or a
quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated in use or in the
relevant market as a single whole.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105(6).
62 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
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utilization of the container process by the carrier, the analysis under
prior case law of the tax immunity of the individual packages should
not be altered by the fact that they were stowed in shipping containers
while in the possession of the carrier.
In some cases, however, the question of commercial reasonable-
ness may be complicated by the effect of containerization on the
method of packaging the goods for export. As discussed above,13
construction of the containers permits the shipper to use less expen-
sive and less substantial packaging in the preparation of goods for
shipment. As a result, these packages may not be "in the ordinary
form in which from time to time immemorial, foreign goods have
been brought into the country." 4 For example, goods traditionally
packaged in heavy wooden crates or in cases might now be packaged
in lightweight cardboard boxes or in paper wrappers. Presented with
a radical departure from traditional packaging, a court might find the
determination of commercial reasonableness made more difficult by
the dissimilarity between the new packages and packages commonly
utilized in bona fide transactions in the past.
A possible resolution of this problem would be to apply a "func-
tional economics test" similar to that employed in Royal Typewriter
Co. v. M/V Kulmerland5 to determine whether the container was a
"6package" within the meaning § 4 (5) of the Carriage of Goods at
Sea Act." That case involved the loss overboard of three shipping
containers, each containing 350 typewriters. The court noted that
before containerization typewriters were shipped in heavy wooden
cases containing twelve to twenty-four typewriters each. However,
when prepared for shipment by container, the typewriters were pack-
aged individually in lightweight cardboard cartons.
In resolving the question of whether these cartons were packages
under § 4 (5), the test employed focused upon whether the cartons
were functional packing units: unless the individual cartons would
have been suitable for conventional break-bulk shipment, the burden
is on the shipper to show by other evidence that his units are them-
selves "packages" under § 4 (5). In Royal Typewriter, the shipper
was unable to meet that burden.17
Applied to the original package doctrine, the test would be that
unless the individual cartons or cases were substantially similar to
65 See Section III, supra.
'1 Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 359 (1900).
" 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973).
- 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (1971).
,7 483 F.2d 645, 649. But see, Simon, note 5 supra, at 520-30.
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traditional (pre-container) packaging units, the importer would be
required to show that the units of import were commercially reasona-
ble units in which bona fide transactions between foreign shippers and
domestic importers are commonly carried about. The fact that the
test focuses upon practical commercial considerations would seem to
find support in both Austin v. Tennessee,68 and Hooven & Allison Co.
v. Evatt.9
V. CONCLUSION
Although the immunity of imports from state taxation has, since
1827, focused upon the package concept, courts have found that to
limit consideration solely to the nature of the package can lead to a
result which is clearly absurd in the light of the policies behind the
original package doctrine. In May v. New Orleans the Supreme
Court recognized that holding the small packages to be immune from
state taxation would be unwarranted in the light of the objectives of
the import-export clause, even though such a result would be valid
under the broad language of Brown v. Maryland. It seemed obvious
to the Court that the framers did not intend imported goods to be
forever beyond the reach of the states' taxing power.
Likewise, in Austin v. Tennessee, the immunity was held to
apply only to bona fide and commercially reasonable units of impor-
tation. Again the Court recognized that the size or form of the pack-
age should not be the basis of the constitutional immunity, but that
the doctrine should be applied to protect those commercial interests
which the framers thought worthy of protection.
Finally, in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, the Court made clear
that the constitutional immunity from taxation should not depend
upon the formalities of the importation, but upon the essential nature
of the transaction. Again, the Court choose a practical application
of the doctrine rather than a rigid formalized one.
It is in this framework that the container process should be
viewed, and it should be recognized that the process is fundamentally
concerned only with the mode of transportation of the goods and does
not alter the essential nature of the transaction. Goods imported in
commercially reasonable units, in a bona fide transaction, should not
lose their immunity from state taxation merely because of the mode
of transport which the shipper and carrier happen to choose. The
formalistic approach of the Volkswagen Pacific case would lead to
179 U.S. 343 (1900).
" 324 U.S. 652 (1945). See also note 24, supra.
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the anomalous result of rendering one import immune from taxation,
while stripping another, in the same form, of its immunity. As an
example, wine imported in cases by the traditional break-bulk
method would be entitled to immunity under Low v. Austin, but
identical cases imported in containerships would not be immune
under the analysis of Volkswagen Pacific.
Consequently, containerization should not have a direct impact
upon the tax immunity of goods imported by that method. Rather,
the immunity should be determined on the same basis as it has always
been: with reference to the form of the packages in which the shipper
prepares his goods for export.
William J. Kelly, Jr.
